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WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY
BOOK REVIEWS
AN INTRODUCTION TO LEGAL REASONING. By Edward H. Levi. Chicago:
The University of Chicago Press. 1949. Pp. 74. $2.00.
Professor Levi's book is both short and practical. Its general thesis is
that since language is necessarily ambiguous, and since law is expressed in
language, the function of legal reasoning is to resolve ambiguity. The type
of reasoning developed for this purpose, "reasoning by example," does not
meet the standards which we expect deductive and inductive logic to meet.
Imperfect for scientific or philosophical use, it is better suited than the
more nearly perfect logics to deal with its own peculiar problem, i.e., the
adjustment of law to a changing society in the act of applying it to actual
disputes. "Reasoning by example" is not criticized, nor is its modification
advocated. Its imperfections are traps for those who do not know them;
but they are advantages to those who wish to keep the law, without constant
verbal amendment or physical revolution, somewhere near the changing
society that lives under it.
After statement of the principal thesis, Professor Levi applies it to the
three situations in which Anglo-American courts operate: case-law, statutory
construction, and constitutional interpretation. The first he illustrates with
the cases developing the liability of vendors to remote purchasers, the second
with the judicial construction of the Mann White Slave Act, and the third
with the interpretation of the commerce clause. The discussion brings out the
use of "reasoning by example" in all three situations, and reaches important
conclusions about the different degrees of judicial control of society which
inhere in each one. It is implicit, but not developed, that these differences
should be a vital part of any decision whether to leave a problem to case-
law, to regulate it by statute, or to handle it by constitutional revision. So
far as I know, it is a new and promising approach to this question.
Some will probably feel that the thesis depends upon a too emphatic and
too inclusive statement of the ambiguity of legal rules. The reaction would
be natural to one who works with routine and, especially, with non-litigated
matters. But adequate analysis must take care of the hard cases; the
routine ones will not give trouble anyway. A lawyer who has worked
under a state court's development of proximate cause or last clear chance for
example, will probably agree that the statement of ambiguity is not too
strong. Again, one may feel that the acceptance of ambiguity in statutes
as our permanent fate, is too pessimistic. But, assuming competent draft-
ing, the ambiguities, as Professor Levi suggests, often result from the
impossibility of getting a majority to agree on anything more precise, and
this difficulty, which arises from common human failings, is not likely to
be corrected soon enough to outmode his suggestions. Moreover, legislation
that, through some happy chance, offers no problems worth litigation, will
almost certainly generate some as society develops under it, and the more
important the legislation is, the more certain it is to do so.
One of Professor Levi's ideas invites further comment. It is a fact that
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in statutory construction the courts are less free than in case-law, because,
while they can alter the meaning of the prescribed words, they cannot alter
the words themselves, and because their own decisions establish a tendency
or direction for the statute. In constitutional interpretation on the other
hand, they are more free than in dealing with statutes because, from the
nature of the case, they can more easily desert their own decisions, return
to the document, and even declare frankly that the words cannot be limited
to the conditions known to the draftsmen. It seems that the description of
our actual position under statutes is accurate, but it is not a necessary
condition. There is no inherent reason why a court should not possess the
freedom in dealing with statutes that it has in dealing with constitutions.
Perhaps only the fact that so much of our law is case-law has prevented
courts from claiming this freedom. As current trends toward legislative
remedies continue, and as our case-law, from its very mass, increases the
pressure for total codification, we may witness a change in statutory con-
struction toward the methods now current in constitutional interpretation
and it may be helpful to have the latter method at hand to imitate. All
this, however, is not inconsistent with Professor Levi's thesis; it is only
one of the numerous dark places in which it sheds useful light.
To conclude, books of general jurisprudence and of logical analysis are
of value to the teaching and research functions in law, but they are hardly
ever concrete enough to repay a practicing lawyer, otherwise than intellec-
tually, for the time consumed in their study. This concise book is an excep-
tion to the rule. Its values to the teacher and student are obvious; but the
practicing lawyer will find it far more valuable to him than others of its
kind. He will find its description of his methods accurate in his own field,
while the generalized statement and application will help him work in
unfamiliar areas, by carrying over much of his experience whose applicabil-
ity he might not easily recognize. The book may displease those on the
other hand, who believe that the law is, or can be made, a logical and
coherent system. But that is a battle which we can hope is already won.
A. C. Becht.*
MATERIALS ON ACCOUNTING. By Robert Amory. Brooklyn: The Founda-
tions Press, Inc., 1949. Pp. xxiii, 781. Price $7.00.
The day is definitely past when a lawyer can boast of his ignorance of
accounting. Almost unheralded, a new profession has arisen, "accounting-
based law." Mr. Amory has written a valuable book to acquaint readers,
particularly law students, with accounting. He makes it plain that he
does not purport to treat "Legal Accounting." In fact, he seems to doubt
whether there is any such thing; instead he regards accounting as a
universal language.
Students and practicing lawyers alike should prepare themselves to prac-
tice the new profession, else they may find themselves excluded more and
* Professor of Law, Washington University.
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